offered charity. But according to my friend and people in the disability rights movement, many of his disadvantages could and indeed should be addressed through social change. If so, then we shouldn't shake our heads in pity over his case; we should wrestle with how to do justice for him.
Sociopolitical Conception of Disability
Disability scholars often distinguish between an impairment (usually taken to be a non-standard state of the body, such as deafness or paraplegia) and disability (understood to be a lack of fit between the body and the social environment, resulting in disadvantages for the individual who is impaired). With this distinction, the disadvantage of disability is something that calls out for social change. In many cases, people with impairments prefer not to have their bodies altered (as when Deaf individuals do not want cochlear implants), or are simply faced with no known medical treatments for their impairments (e.g., spinal cord injuries result in paralysis that cannot be "fixed"). The disability rights movement has emphasized how such people deserve fair opportunities to work and to engage in a variety of aspects of social life, even if their modes of functioning are nonstandard. Indeed, it has celebrated the diversity of ways of living and attempted to help the non-disabled public rethink the concept of disability.
One problem with the impairment/disability distinction is that it creates terminological confusion in discussions with people who presume that disability is inherently in the body. One consequence is that the sociopolitical model of disability may appear overstated if it always insists on social change rather than M y friend T was diagnosed with bipolar disorder over a decade ago, just in the midst of his medical residency. Since that time, he hasn't been able to complete his residency, though he's held a variety of different jobs, some of them making use of his medical knowledge (intake physician for insurance companies), others not (golf course attendant). Although T will grant that he needed help at the time of his diagnosis, to this day he doesn't approve of the kind of help he received (relatively coerced but officially "voluntary" commitment, a wide range of ineffective pharmaceutical cocktails, electroshock). Like many people diagnosed as bipolar, he has at various times come off the medications prescribed for him. In part this is due to frustration with their side effects (liver damage, weight gain, hair loss, mental fuzziness, anxiety) and their limited effectiveness. But it's also because he questions whether whatever occurred in his brain and resulted in his difficulty functioning "normally" is chronic, and in any case, he's not convinced that "normal" functioning is always to be preferred. In this judgment, he is echoed by many patients and former patients, both those relatively sanguine about psychiatry (Redfield Jamison) and those who identify with the more radical "psychiatric survivors' network." What he wants is to be respected for his abilities, accommodated for his illness (when it cannot be adequately treated), and treated as capable of making a positive social contribution.
When many people hear T's story, they think, "What a sad story; what bad luck!" They understand it through a lens of personal tragedy and misfortune. If they sense unfairness, it is unfairness in an existential or perhaps even divine sense: how could the impersonal world or God treat him so poorly? The idea that some part-perhaps even a large part -of his disadvantage is socially imposed is foreign to them. Most people firmly believe in a medical model of disability, and by extension, a medical model of psychiatric disability. For them, disability is an intrinsic feature of a person, and the best way to help a disabled person is to find a cure. If a cure is not available, the person might be compensated for an inability to work, or pitied and
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"Mental Illness" and Justice as Recognition Sara Goering
bodily treatments, when many people recognize that some impairments clearly result in bodily disadvantages. Disabled people acknowledge the existence of negative "impairment effects" (e.g., pain, lack of energy) that also create disadvantage and might rightly be addressed through medical means, but their point is that such disadvantages are often minimal compared to the social, institutional, and attitudinal barriers they face daily.
In an attempt to clarify the language confusion, Ron Amundson and Shari Tresky offer a distinction between "conditional disadvantages of impairment" (what could be eliminated via social change) and "unconditional disadvantages of impairment" (what will linger even after social change for inclusion). So, for example, a blind person might have the unconditional disadvantage of being unable to see, but the relevance of that disadvantage might be minimal if she did not have the conditional disadvantage of not being able to get a job (if the use of Braille texts or online screen readers is presumed to be an obstacle to performing the duties of the job).
Disability scholars have argued that addressing the conditional disadvantages of impairment should be a matter of justice rather than charity. Furthermore, justice cannot simply offer paltry compensation to people who are unable to work in a typical fashion, as the U.S. model of disability insurance has tended to do. Disabled people are often forced to choose between taking disability payments and taking a job; if they are working, they do not qualify for any assistance, even if the costs of wheelchairs or attendant services are prohibitive.
Disability scholar Anita Silvers has argued that when capable disabled people are kept out of the workforce, they are stigmatized and isolated, even if they are financially compensated for their inability to work. For most of us, flourishing involves being part of a community and contributing to it. People who could contribute but are not accommodated are then left feeling less valuable and are often perceived by others to be burdens on the system. Furthermore, the group of people who may be unable to work without accommodations will likely include all of us at some point in time-nearly 1 in 5 people in the U.S. is disabled, and that figure does not include the number of people who are temporarily disabled, nor does it account for the coming surge of impairment as the baby boom generation ages and lives with the inevitable frailty of their bodies. Providing accommodations for disabled people, then, should be seen as part and parcel of the practice of providing access to opportunities for all citizens, rather than seeing people with impairments as a special needy class.
One way to frame the question of justice for disabled people is through appeal to recognition as an element of justice. By this I mean that disabled people have a right to be recognized for their distinctive features (impairments) and their valuing of them, to be part of decision-making about institutional structures that may include or exclude them, and to be treated with respect and as equal partners in that decision-making. Borrowing from Nancy Fraser, misrecognition occurs when "some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them."In being misrecognized, they are rendered "inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, [and] hence less than full partners in social interaction." Gay and lesbian couples make a claim of misrecognition in regard to access to marriage; disabled people have clearly made this claim in regard to access to work. Justice, then, requires those who are more dominant to listen carefully and respectfully to the claims of the misrecognized and socially oppressed, and with them to craft policies that allow for their full participatory parity. In the case of disabled people, this involves recognizing the nature of conditional disadvantages of impairment (as reported by disabled people) and providing accommodations that allow them participatory parity (including access to education and the workplace).
Sociopolitical Conception of Psychiatric Disability?
The matter is a bit more difficult when we turn to mental illness, or what might be called psychiatric disability. Here the kind of impairment seems to challenge more fully the "norm" of a worker or even a regular citizen. We may be open to multiple modes of functioning (reading text vs. Braille, conversing verbally or with ASL, rolling vs. walking, etc.), but we tend to think that functioning itself takes a certain kind of cognitive capacity and reliability. Even making reasonable claims of misrecognition requires cognitive reliability. So mental illness seems to challenge the sociopolitical model of disability and our understanding of justice as recognition.
Here I use bipolar disorder as my example. Briefly, bipolar disorder involves cyclical episodes of mania and depression. The mania may include delusions, inflated self-esteem, diminished judgment, racing thoughts, distractibility, and "excessive involvement in pleasurable activities that have a high potential for painful consequences" (e.g., shopping well beyond one's means). Depression involves a depressed mood, feelings of worthlessness, despondency, lack of energy, weight loss or gain, and sleep disturbances. Furthermore, many trust their judgment in making those claims. With bipolar disorder, the symptoms of the disease include delusions that may result in diminished judgment. When my friend called up to report that he'd lost his job, he told me a friend-turned-enemy called the police and attempted to have him committed, after growing animosity at work and a charge that he was manic and potentially a harm to himself and others. I confess that my first inclination was to think that maybe this "friend-turned-enemy" was truly a friend, trying to help in the only way he knew. I couldn't imagine my friend making any violent threats, but why would his good friend turn against him? I would normally believe him, but knowing his psychiatric history, I hesitated. He was talking quickly, he was agitated, and he was distraught. Of course, all those symptoms would also be expected in someone who has just been betrayed by a friend and wrongly accused, resulting in the loss of his job. So herein lies the difficulty. When the impairment in question is one that results in diminished judgment, and in inability to self-reflect accurately, how are we to evaluate claims to misrecognition people diagnosed as bipolar, especially in the throes of mania, do not consider themselves in need of any help or treatment.
At least two features of mental illness complicate the possibility of making claims of misrecognition and understanding mental illness as a psychiatric disability for which sociopolitical adjustments are due. First, as noted above, people with mental illnesses may not be reliable reporters of their own needs and interests (given the nature of their impairment and its effect on their judgment and recognition that they are impaired). Second, the accommodations that need to be made for physical impairments are relatively stable (i.e., once put in place, the individual can function steadily: think of curb cuts or elevators). In contrast, the functional capacities of many individuals who have mental illness often fluctuate significantly over time.
Unreliability of Judgment
One problem with relying on individuals to make claims of misrecognition is that you have to be able to 
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Instability of Functioning
In my friend's case, a significant conditional disadvantage of his illness is that he has difficulty finding jobs that both challenge him intellectually and are able to accommodate his episodes of illness. In part, I think this has to do with the inflexibility of most job requirements. He desperately wants to work and to contribute, and he would very much like to make use of his considerable medical skills. It seems unlikely that he'll complete a residency, given the high stress environments that are built into the structure of medical training (long hours, little sleep, large caseload). We might argue that the structure of residencies ought to be changed, and likely there's a good case to be made that it should be more humane for every aspiring physician. But even with significant changes, my friend might not be able to succeed there given his unpredictable and overwhelming anxiety attacks. This is part of the difficulty of accommodating people with mental illness. If a person's mood or ability to concentrate changes regularly (and more sharply than is "normal"), how can a workplace provide "reasonable" accommodations?
In trying to figure this out, it's helpful to compare mental illness with chronic illness, such as chronic fatigue syndrome or multiple sclerosis which primarily affect physical parts of the body but do not do so consistently. Pain, energy levels, and mobility may shift drastically by the day. As such, the unconditional disadvantages of the impairment are difficult to ignore, and making appropriate accommodations is challenging.
Philosopher Susan Wendell has written eloquently about her own struggles with chronic fatigue and argues that, like other impairments, chronic illness can be understood as both epistemologically rewarding and physically troublesome. She says she would welcome a cure, but doesn't need one, and through her struggles she has learned to see both the unfairness of ableism and the ways in which standard modes of functioning are institutionalized as the only modes of or mistreatment? Our usual best source of information-the misrecognized individual himself -appears unreliable.
I should note that people who have success in treating their bipolar disorder, or who learn to live with it even without drugs, are generally trustworthy sources. Indeed, they may know best from personal experience how to understand the disadvantages and difficulties of mental illness and also how best to accommodate and assist an individual in the throes of depression or mania. But the problem is that it is not always evident who is in the throes of mania or depression and who has successfully treated or adapted to the disease, as my friend's case above demonstrates.
In pondering the unreliability of judgment, one relevant consideration is how the label of bipolar disorder affects third party evaluations of judgment and mood. People who have received a bipolar diagnosis report feeling that they have to control their emotions much more so than other people, in part to avoid the suspicion that they are "going crazy" again. In The LoonyBin Trip, Kate Millet reports on her own battles with bipolar disorder and highlights how difficult it is to be ebullient when everyone keeps asking "are you still taking your medications?" She suggests that in many respects she did not "go mad" but was rather "driven crazy" by this obsessive focus on her possible symptoms. If people expect you to be crazy, they may skew their interpretation of your judgment. This seems particularly dangerous when the person in question is already marginalized in many respects.
Another consideration is our tendency to generalize from some experiences of delusional thinking or diminished judgment to the belief that the person is unreliable or delusional broadly speaking. We might think that to be reliable, one must exhibit an overwhelming dependability, with honest and accurate judgment, and so we might be led to think that a person with bipolar can't be reliable. But episodes of unreliability can surely be excused, as they are for all of us. I can't be relied on to do my job well when I am sick or when my daughter is sick; my friend may be unreliable when he's experiencing an episode of mania or depression. That doesn't mean that he is never capable or even that he's generally unreliable. Furthermore, an individual's ability to recognize that something is wrong in his thinking might be easier to exercise if he isn't faced with the possibility of job loss or blame or stigma in admitting that he needs help.
My simple point here is that while unreliability in judgment may suggest that claims of misrecognition are not to be trusted, if we recognize the episodes of unreliability against a larger background of ability and competence, we can see that people with bipolar diagnoses can effectively speak for themselves and may simply need accommodation for the fact of their ill-
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Conclusions
I don't want to romanticize mental illness. It can be devastating and emotionally wrenching for all involved parties, and working out appropriate accommodations will be difficult and may be expensive. Yet surely we can figure out ways to create more flexibility in the workplace and in laws and policies that govern disability insurance and payments so that people with mental illness can live better, more satisfying lives. In my friend's case, he has worked extensively as a volunteer peer counselor and mental health advocate. Such work is undoubtedly valuable. But it is unpaid, and the disability payments he receives keep him at the poverty level, with no cushion. Surely we can do better in recognizing the value he brings to the world, and supporting him in making his contributions.
When we think about mental illness as a medical problem, we have a tendency to think that medical experts are best placed to know what to do about it. But if we see it through the lens of social oppression, what we find is that people who have experienced the disadvantages might be best placed to offer their insights into their needs and the best methods to include them in society. Listening to them, and working to include them more fully in the workplace or at least to recognize their equal status as beings in the human community, is a matter of doing justice.
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Philosophy, University of Washington sgoering@u.washington.edu functioning. She notes that people with chronic illness need "access to the workplace [that] often includes the ability to work part-time, with some flexibility to accommodate periods of greater or lesser illness." In her own situation, the university policy was that faculty could work part-time for two years under disability insurance, but after that they were required either to be fully rehabilitated or fully disabled. Individuals with chronic illness cannot meet the former, but are still capable of working successfully and so should not be described as the latter. Why couldn't workplaces offer a wider variety of options for workers, at least recognizing that impairment or illness need not fully incapacitate a person?
Other accommodations might not be tied to jobs so much as improved services to make flourishing without a job easier. Mental health services are poorly funded, despite a variety of legislative and public education efforts to achieve parity in health funding and insurance coverage. Services that do exist are often quite disjointed and may not have any fail-safe mechanisms. For instance, my friend recently received an eviction notice after his disability-related housing assistance check failed to arrive for three months (due to administrative bungling by the county in which he lives). Provision of reasonable housing and more than a minimal level of financial and social support could drastically improve the situation of many who are currently living on the edge.
In the book Havens, which examines projects around the country that have attempted to provide housing for a variety of people in need, the authors describe grassroots programs that provide residential homes for people with mental illness. Residents pay a small monthly fee for room and board and have chores in the house, but otherwise are free to do as they like. When the authors interviewed the members of one such house, they found that the house members "seemed to value each other in a way that did not rest on the usual conditions of social status. They did not judge each other by what they had become. They knew they were no longer part of the American frenzy for overachievement-no curriculum vitae could describe their successes. They valued each other for just being there, which gave them a much keener appreciation for each others' unique and lovable quirks. They knew they were characters, as sympathetic as the ones in a good story." Such programs deserve funding.
Why couldn't workplaces offer a wider variety of options for workers, at least recognizing that impairment or illness need not fully incapacitate a person?
